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Abstract—A conversational agent to detect anomalous traffic
in consumer IoT networks is presented. The agent accepts two
inputs in the form of user speech received by Amazon Alexa
enabled devices, and classified IDS logs stored in a DynamoDB
Table. Aural analysis is used to query the database of network
traffic, and respond accordingly. In doing so, this paper presents a
solution to the problem of making consumers situationally aware
when their IoT devices are infected, and anomalous traffic has
been detected. The proposed conversational agent addresses the
issue of how to present network information to non-technical
users, for better comprehension, and improves awareness of
threats derived from the mirai botnet malware.
Index Terms—Situational Awareness, Intrusion Detection, Bot-
net, DDoS, Amazon Echo, Alexa, Virtual Assistant, Conversa-
tional Agent.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) continues to grow and per-
meate into many areas of everyday life. Three areas of
particular growth are in health, industrial applications and
smart cities. Central to the future of smart cities, is the
smart home, where an uptake of low cost and ease to deploy
IoT devices, has already been witnessed. This flourishing
smart home IoT market is fuelled largely by the promise
of convenience, greater inter-connectivity and automation of
everyday tasks [1]. As a result, smart devices such as IP
cameras, doorbells with alert notifications, and light bulbs
capable of being switched on using a digital assistant such as
an Amazon echo, are increasingly becoming commonplace in
the home. Whilst smart interconnected devices clearly have
many benefits, concerns still exist around the security and
privacy of such devices, and data derived therein. A trend is
evident whereby market forces, and the need to be competitive,
have placed IoT manufacturers under increasing pressure to
produce low cost, plug and play smart devices. Popular with
consumers, these devices often omit vital security and privacy
mechanisms (to promote simplicity and adoption), exposing
devices to potential threats and leaving them vulnerable to
potential attackers. Arguably one of the most serious threats
facing IoT devices, is that of botnets. The vast threat landscape
afforded by the IoT, and the inherent vulnerabilities of many
smart devices, has provided the perfect platform to perform
large scale distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [2].
Indeed, many powerful DDoS attacks have been witnessed in
recent years, with the most prominent example being the Mirai
botnet, which denied service to some of the most widely used
platforms on the Internet such as Twitter, Netflix and Reddit
[2].
A common trait of many of these high profile DDoS attacks,
has been their exploitation of smart devices commonly found
in consumer homes, such as IP cameras, and home routers [3].
In our previous work [1], we investigated if a representative
sample of consumers (n=158) were able to identify if an IoT
device was infected with malware such as mirai, and was
being used to perform DDoS attacks. A cross-sectional study
was performed to allow multiple variables to be compared.
To evaluate consumers perception and awareness of threats
facing the IoT, the sandboxed botnet environment established
in [3] was used. This consisted of a (C&C) server, to remotely
control the infected smart devices (bots), and a scan/loader
server to infect new smart devices with the botnet malware.
Several smart IP cameras were infected, and used as bots to
perform a variety of DDoS attacks, during which live video
feeds were recorded. The consumers were presented with the
recorded video feeds, and asked to identify which cameras
were infected. Results demonstrated that across all age ranges
(18-60+) and technical abilities (Novice-Expert) it was very
difficult for consumers to be situationally aware of infected
IoT devices.
This paper presents a solution towards the detection of
botnet activity within consumer IoT devices and networks. A
conversational agent was implemented, and its effectiveness to
improve consumers situational awareness, tested. We imple-
mented our approach by using our previously created dataset
[3], which was amended and simplified for application in this
study (detailed in Section III-A). An Amazon Echo device was
used to interact with a developed Alexa Skill, which sent user
queries to an AWS Lambda function, which in turn queried
the dataset, and returned an appropriate response to the user.
Thus, the main contributions of this paper are:
1) A scalable serverless ETL pipeline for parsing intrusion
detection logs;
2) A novel conversational agent utilising aural analysis for
detecting anomalous traffic in consumer IoT networks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
introduces the concept of situational awareness, specifically
it’s application to the Cyber domain. It also presents common
methods of network monitoring and threat detection. Finally,
the use of virtual assistants within the IoT is discussed. Section
III details the methodology used to generate the necessary
classified network traffic, and means of querying the data by
use of aural analysis. Implementation of the ETL pipeline and
conversational agent are presented in Section IV. Section V
describes participant recruitment, evaluation undertaken and
results gained. Section VI presents final conclusions, study
limitations, and future research suggestions.
II. BACKGROUND
For our related works, we shall consider the topics Cyber
Situational Awareness (SA), common methods of network
monitoring and threat detection, and the growing use of virtual
assistants in the IoT. Although other threats exist, the rise of
botnet activity in the IoT, is considered of utmost importance,
and will therefore form the basis of threats considered in this
study.
A. Cyber Situational Awareness
Situational awareness (SA) is often traced back to the
seminal work presented by Endsley in [4]. A study was
presented which investigated if enhancing SA in aircraft pilots
could increase their likelihood of making optimal decisions
in dynamic situations. In [5] the author continued the work
and presented a SA theoretical model, applicable across a
variety of environments and systems, beyond aviation. Here,
the author defines SA as a person’s state of knowledge
about a dynamic environment. Specifically, their perception
of elements in the local environment, the comprehension of
their meaning and relevance to the person’s goals, and a
projection of future states of the environment based on this
understanding. The SA model presented by Endsley in [5]
is considered of central importance to SA research, and has
therefore been widely adopted as a reference model, and
subsequently applied to a broad range of research areas.
The model is comprised of three levels, namely Perception,
Comprehension and Projection which combine and contribute
to achieving a level of awareness in a given situation. They
can be defined as:
1) Perception: the consciousness of relevant elements in
the environment, specifically the status, attributes, and
dynamics of elements in relation to the environment.
2) Comprehension: the synthesis of the seemingly disjointed
elements at level 1, to understand their significance, fuse
together to derive meaning and patterns, and foster a
holistic understanding of the environment.
3) Projection: the ability to project the current situation
of the environment into the future, predict the likely
subsequent actions of elements, ultimately allowing better
decisions to made in dynamic situations.
In [6] McGuiness and Foy extended Endley’s model to
include an additional level, defined as resolution. Here, the
aim is to establish the best course of action to take to change
the current situation to the desired state. Resolution is achieved
by considering all possible actions from a range, and selecting
the most appropriate course of action accordingly [7].
When applied to the Cyber domain, Cyber SA can be
defined as the compilation, processing and fusing of network
data to understand a network environment and accurately
predict and respond to potential threats that might occur.
Seminal work by Denning [8] focused on the detection of
cyber attacks, leading to the Joint Directors Laboratories
(JDL) creating a conceptual data fusion model which identified
the processes, functions, categories, and specific techniques
applicable to data fusion [9]. Drawing similarities to Endsley’s
model it defined levels for Data Assessment, Object Assess-
ment, Situation Assessment, Threat Refinement, and Process
refinement. Importantly, it highlighted the importance of hu-
man elements in achieving SA. In [7] Tadda combined the
JDL Data Fusion model with Endsley’s SA model to propose a
Situational Awareness model applicable to the Cyber domain.
The authors addressed the differences between level 2 and 3
of the JDL model and Endsley’s Projection level. In doing so,
they argued that a computer system is capable of identifying
the occurrence of an activity based on priori knowledge and
cannot itself develop or provide Situation Awareness; only a
person (the decision maker) can derive the awareness. They
drew comparisons between the two models and asserted that
level 2 of the JDL model and Endsley’s Comprehension
level address the current situation. Whereas, level 3 of the
JDL model and Endsley’s Projection level address the ability
to project the current situation into the future, in order to
predict future impacts and threats. Essentially, they propose
splitting level 2 and 3 JDL assessments based on time rather
than functionality. Other prominent researchers in the Cyber
domain have used these models, in particular Endsley’s model,
to further research in this area. In [10] Onwubiko identifies the
functional attributes of situational awareness for network/cyber
security. A SA model for network security is presented and
ten fundamental attributes are suggested, which the author
proposes should be considered when implementing any SA
system in the domain. In [11] the author extended the work
and presented an adapted version of Endsley’s SA reference
model [5]. The model incorporated Endsley’s initial levels
Perception, Comprehension and Projection and also the fourth
level Resolution proposed by McGuiness and Foy [6]. The
proposed Cyber SA Instantiation Model overlays Endsley’s
model but is generalised to be applicable across the Cyber
domain. An additional fifth awareness level is presented and
fuses with the previous four levels as follows:
L0 - Information Generating Sources: Log sources such
as event logs, which are evidence of an attack or exploit,
but are unable to detect an attack without functions from the
subsequent levels.
L1 - Perceive: use of individual toolkits to gather raw data
from Level 0 about perceived situations in the network. Infor-
mation is classified into meaningful representations to form the
basis for comprehension. Four distinct sources of information
are identified which contribute to this level namely, Protection
sources, Threat Intelligence sources, Tracking sources, Exter-
nal Intel sources.
L2 - Comprehend: use of analysis tools and techniques
to continually anaylse and synthesise information from Level
1. Fusions of disparate events and correlation of information
from multiple sources, to link evidence and gain an holistic
overview of the situation.
L3 - Projection: analysed intelligence once comprehended,
can be used to predict future events and situations. Performed
as a real-time continuous process, allows possible mitigations
against threats to be recommended.
L4 - Resolve: recover and resolve situations using mitigation
strategies identified in level 3. Coordination is required for
triage, investigation, classification, and prioritisation in order
to resolve, remedy, and recover events and Cyber situations.
SA when applied to the Cyber domain is still relatively
immature as a research area. The general models discussed
here, and adapted versions for the Cyber domain, do however
form a good basis for assessing and enabling the application
of SA in the Cyber domain.
B. Network Monitoring and Threat Detection
Network monitoring and Threat detection are common tasks
undertaken to foster greater SA of activity on a network.
Administrators collect logs from a variety of sources, such
as Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems or Traffic Analy-
sis Software, to understand baseline behaviour, and identify
anomolous traffic on the network. When using alerts from an
IDS to monitor a network, systems can be classified by two
distinct methods, with a third hybrid approach also available.
Signature-based Detection. Uses known rules (signatures) of
previous attacks, and compares these against collected data.
Matches found invoke an alert, with high true positive and
low false positive rates possible for known attacks. Con-
versely, signature-based detection can return low detection
rates for zero day (new) attacks [12]. Anomaly-based detection.
Compares current network traffic with a baseline of normal
network behavior. Any significant deviation from this baseline
is detected and classified as an anomaly, raising an alert. Good
detection for new or unknown attacks is often achievable,
although high false positive rates are also common [12].
Specification-based Detection. A hybrid of the previous two
methods, where specifications are developed to describe nor-
mal network behavior. Two detection mechanisms are usually
combined, one to detect known attacks using signatures, the
other to monitor traffic and detect deviations from normal net-
work behaviour. Low false positive rates can often be achieved,
compared with just anomaly-based detection methods [12].
Irrespective of the monitoring tool used, data is commonly
conveyed to the administrator through a variety of methods,
including data visualisation. In [13] the authors investigated
visual analytic methods for log files, and concluded this to be
an effective way for humans to identify patterns in traffic. This
view is corroborated in other studies [14] [15], where authors
in [16] suggest the use of visualisation improves situational
awareness, since it aids in perceiving and comprehending
the current status of the network, with prediction of future
situations also possible.
Despite promise, some authors highlight shortcomings in
text and visual based monitoring systems, arguing that they
require the full attention of the administrator to prevent
missing key information [17]. They propose the use of data
sonification, as a method to improve situational awareness of
network activity. Here, raw data is presented in audio form
(generally non-speech), and has been used across a wide range
of fields. It’s application to computer security is summarised
in [18], where the author suggests that due to its time based
nature, and our auditory cognition, sonification is especially
suitable for data that changes over time.
In [19] the authors present a formalised model for designing
sonifications for network security monitoring. They conducted
a study in [20] investigating the attitudes towards using sonifi-
cation by security practitioners. Results showed high potential
for its use in peripheral monitoring (whilst undertaking other
tasks), demonstrating it could be combined with visualisation
to address its limitations, and form a multimodal approach to
network monitoring.
C. Use of Virtual Assistants in the IoT
A Virtual Assistant (VA) is a term often used to describe
a spoken dialogue system, which uses an intelligent agent to
assist users to complete tasks through auditory interactions.
Growing in popularity, they have been widely adopted by
a range of companies, producing Microsoft’s Cortana, Ap-
ple’s Siri, Google’s Assistant, and arguably the most popular,
Amazon’s Alexa. Devices such as Amazon’s Echo and its
conversational agent Alexa, provide opportunities to build
feature rich conversational interactions.
Research in this area is growing, and producing some very
promising applications of virtual assistants. In [21] a system
is presented using Amazon’s Alexa and Node-Red, a simple
and powerful automation platform, to interconnect and control
numerous IoT devices. The system provides the ability to
switch smart devices e.g. lightbulbs on/off, monitor iPhone
statistics, and use voice commands to control a heater. The
research offers a lot of promise in this area, but a lack of
details made it difficult to fully assess functionality.
In [22] a smart home system is presented, using the Reverb
and Telegram mobile apps, to control smart appliances in the
home. The reverb app is used to send voice commands to
the Alexa Voice Service in AWS, which interfaces with a
local raspberry pi, to switch a device on/off. The Telegram
app is used to send commands via text, and perform similar
tasks. Functionality was limited, but returned positive results,
demonstrating good promise in this area.
The next generation of virtual assistants is presented in
[23]. A multi-modal dialogue system is developed to com-
bine multiple user input modes, such as speech, touch and
verbal/non verbal gestures. The authors propose a system
which uses a camera and kinnect device to receive speech and
gesture input commands, which are processed and stored in
a knowledgebase. The application of the system was unclear,
however future use cases are suggested including, educational
assistance, robotics and home automation.
In [24] the use of virtual assistants to assist the elderly,
was assessed. The authors propose that virtual assistants could
be used to combat social isolation amongst elderly people.
Microsoft’s Cortana, Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assistant, and
Amazon’s Alexa, were tested for their ability to complete
tasks, which could improve the issue. Each assistant was
tested for functionality, and their ability to provide a basic
greeting, email management, social media, and social games.
The results presented were inconclusive, but did demonstrate
the range of applications, and problems, virtual assistants
could be used to address.
Finally, some interesting research has been conducted in
[25] which looked at the personification of virtual assistants,
such as the Amazon Echo. They found 30% of customers
would like to treat the Amazon Echo as a human character
due to its personified name (Alexa) and ability to talk. It is
clear from the research presented, that virtual assistants offer
a wide range of use cases and applications. The willingness
of users to adopt this new method of interacting with devices
and information, and trust towards them, could promote wider
use in the future.
Having reviewed the existing literature, a gap is identified
regarding the use of aural analysis for threat detection and
network monitoring, specifically the use of virtual assistants to
aid situational awareness. Research in [19] [20] demonstrated
the promise of sonification in the area, however studies appear
to focus on non-speech methods. The aim of this paper, is to
make a contribution in this area, specifically using a virtual
assistant to provide aural analysis using Natural Processing
Language (NLP) methods.
III. METHODOLOGY
An overview of the methodology used to generate the
necessary classified network traffic, and means of querying
the data through aural analysis, is presented below.
A. Data Sources
In our previous work [3], a secure sandboxed environment
was created, and a dataset containing IoT botnet traffic was
generated. The generated dataset consisted of 37 captures
(3600 second duration each), over a total of five days, and
was stored in pcap and csv format. Ground truth labels were
assigned, and subsets of the dataset were used to test intrusion
detection models in [3]. The full dataset is available upon
request.
To test the conversational agent presented in Section III-C,
a subset of this dataset was used in this study, containing both
background (classified as normal) and IoT botnet related traffic
(classified as unusual). To aid better understanding of the data,
features were renamed from No. Time, Source, Destination,
Protocol, Label to ID, DateTime, SourceDevice, Destination-
Device, DataType, Activity. Although features Length and Info
were used during the detection and classification of threats in
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Fig. 1. IDS Log Parsing and Storage
[3], the complexity of the information meant they had limited
value for use in the conversational agent. Since they would
not be required later, they were removed.
Finally, the csv files were concatenated, converted to JSON
format, and stored in a specified directory ready to be ingested
by the ETL pipeline described in Section III-B. A sample
record from the newly amended dataset is found in Source
Code 1.
1 {
2 ” ID ” : ” 487 ” ,
3 ” DateTime ” : ” 2 0 / 0 1 / 2 0 1 9 19 :01 ” ,
4 ” SourceDev ice ” : ” 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 5 2 . 4 0 ” ,
5 ” D e s t i n a t i o n D e v i c e ” : ” 1 8 0 . 1 3 0 . 2 3 6 . 1 7 9 ” ,
6 ” DataType ” : ”TCP” ,
7 ” A c t i v i t y ” : ” normal ”
8 }
Source Code 1. Sample JSON record
B. ETL Pipeline for Parsing IDS Logs
The ETL pipeline for handling and uploading IDS logs is
presented in Fig. 1. Suitable IDS logs can be parsed and stored
in the specified directory, ready to be ingested by the ETL
pipeline. For our study, the IDS logs consisted of the amended
dataset described in Section III-A. In (step 1) a script monitors
the directory for new files. When a new JSON file is added,
the file is extracted, transformed, and loaded to an S3 bucket
on AWS. In (step 2) a Lambda function is triggered whenever
a new file is added to the S3 bucket. The use of Lambda allows
code to be executed without provisioning or managing a server.
It also ensures costs are reduced since they only occur when a
function is triggered, and code run. In (step 3) once the handler
object has been triggered, the code in the Lambda function is
executed, and data loaded into the DynamoDB Table.
C. Conversational Agent Architecture
Primary input for the conversational agent is speech derived
from Amazon Alexa enabled devices. Input is analysed using
natural language processing (NLP) techniques to understand
the user query. Requests are then matched against the sec-
ondary input source (IDS logs stored in a DynamoDB table),
and responses are returned accordingly.
The agent consists of three main components: a database
of classified IoT traffic, NLP engine as an interface between
a user and the Alexa device, and a query handler. In the
presented conversational agent, the speech recognition engine
is contained in the Alexa device, the query handler is our
developed Alexa Skill and AWS Lambda function, and a
DynamoDB database are used to store and query classified
IDS logs.
In Fig. 2, the agent frontend is powered by an Amazon
Echo device. NLP software in the Echo device uses speech
recognition to convert user input (in the form of speech),
to text. The query handler acts as the bridge between the
Echo device and the IDS database. The Alexa skill receives
converted aural requests from the Echo device (step 1), and
forwards the request to the AWS Lambda function (step 2). A
query request to interact with the DynamoDB table is triggered
(step 3), which when fulfilled returns an appropriate answer to
the user query. Finally, the the Alexa skill generates an aural
response from the returned answer, invokes the Echo device,
which communicates an aural repsonse to the user (step 4).
The backend of the system is hosted on AWS infrastructure
as a scalable serverless solution, which parses and stores IDS
logs in a DynamoDB table. The handler function is hosted on
AWS Lambda, which is a server-less technology that allows
event-driven code to be run without provisioning servers.
The handler function is used to trigger interaction with the
DynamoDB, and provide functionality to the Alexa Skill.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
To promote reproducibility of this paper, a detailed descrip-
tion of the ETL pipeline and conversational agent are presented
below.
A. ETL Pipeline
The implementation of the ETL pipeline required three
processes, as shown in Fig. 1. In (step 1) crontab was
configured on a local raspberry pi to run a script on a specified
schedule. The script monitored a local directory for new IDS
logs, and invoked a process to upload newly added JSON files
to an S3 bucket on AWS. For our study, the amended dataset
from Section III-A was manually added to the directory and
processed by the ETL pipeline.
To handle the backend functionality, an IAM Role was re-
quired. From the AWS Management Console, a new IAM Role
was created and (AmazonS3FullAccess, AmazonDynamoDB-
FullAccess, and AWSOpsWorksCloudWatchLogs) permissions
assigned.
AWS
Lambda
Alexa  
Skill 
AWS
DynamoDB
Amazon
Echo 
2 31
Response
Query
4
IAM
Fig. 2. Conversational Agent Architecture
In our pipeline, a Lambda Function was used to transfer
items from the S3 bucket into DynamoDB. First, a table was
created using the attributes found in the JSON dataset (see
Source Code 1). DynamoDB is a schema-less database that
only requires a table name and primary key. The tables primary
key is made up of one or two attributes that uniquely identify
items, partition the data, and sort data within each partition.
The ID attribute was set as the primary key to uniquely identify
items.
The Lambda function was configured to be triggered when
a file upload event occurs in the configured S3 bucket.
Lambda handler (event,context) was configured as the handler
to start the AWS Lambda function. Once called, the function
was configured to wait for data to be retrieved through the S3
service, before reading the JSON file. Data was then passed
to the insert data() function, which takes control of the table
first, then iterates through the list and inserts it into the table
using the put item function.
B. Frontend Agent Architecture
From the Alexa Developer Console, a new skill named
Threat Detector was created. An invocation name was as-
signed, and is used to invoke the Alexa Skill from the Echo
device. Twelve intents were configured, and used to trigger
specific event functionality. Seven in-built intents were used as
triggers to perform preconfigured functionality such as repeat,
stop or cancel an intent. Five custom intents were configured
to enable a user to query the DynamoDB table for information,
as detailed below:
1) activitySummaryToday: Responds to a user query and
returns a summary of all activity taking place today.
2) activitySummaryByDate: Responds to a user query and
returns a summary of all activity taking place on a
specified date.
3) activitySummarySrcDevAndDate: Responds to a user
query and returns a summary of all activity from a
specified source device on a specified date.
4) firstUnusualActivityByDate: Responds to a user query
and returns details of the first activity on a specified date,
which is classified as unusual.
5) activityDetailsByID: Responds to a user query and re-
turns details of a specified activity ID.
For each custom intent a series of utterances were config-
ured. Utterances are the phrases a user may use to trigger a
particular intent. Given the variation of spoken language in
the real world, there will often be several ways to express
the same request. To invoke the activitySummaryToday intent
a user could say “show me a summary of today’s activity”,
“show me the summary of today’s activity ” or “show me
summary for today’s activity ”. To ensure an intent could be
invoked using a variety of expressions, a minimum of three
sample utterances were configured for each custom intent.
Utterances which contained words that represent variable
information a user will specify, were assigned a slot. For
example, to invoke intent activityDetailsByID the utterance
“show me details for activity id {ID}” was used, where the
{ID} slot would be replaced with an id number specified by
the user, such as three hundred sixty six.
Finally, the endpoint is set to AWS Lambda, since the Alexa
Skill will invoke the Lambda function to process the identified
request and return a response which is spoken back to the user.
C. Backend Agent Architecture
The main components of the backend architecture are
the AWS Lambda function and DynamoDB table. To control
access to backend resources, the Identity and Access Man-
agement(IAM) service was used to control authentication and
authorisation. An IAM Role was created and inline policies
assigned for DynamoDB access and AWS Lambda execution,
to allow the Alexa Skill to invoke the Lambda function as its
backend.
A DynamoDB table was created using the attributes found
in the JSON dataset (see Source Code 1).
The main engine of the backend query handler, is the AWS
Lambda function. From the AWS Management Console, a new
Lambda function was created, runtime environment specified,
and previously created IAM role attached. A handler object
was specified, which serves as the hook that AWS Lambda
uses to execute the code in the Lambda function. Alexa
Skill Kit was specified as the trigger to execute the Lambda
function, and the Alexa Skill ID was input as the endpoint to
receive POST requests when a user interacts with the Alexa
Skill. Finally, to link the Lambda function to the Alexa Skill,
the Amazon Resource Number (ARN) of the Lambda function
was set as the endpoint for the Alexa Skill, in the Alexa
Developer Console.
V. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
TABLE I. Assessment of Situational Awareness across Use-Cases
Pre Post
Statement Mo* Mo Md** W p
s1 2 4 2 78 0.003
s2 2 3 1 36 0.014
s3 1 1 0.5 28 0.022
s4 4 4 0 1.5 0.999
s5 4 4 0 2 0.999
* Mode ** Median
A. Participants
The Universitys Research Ethics Policy was followed to es-
tablish and promote good ethical practice in the undertaking of
this study. In doing so, consent to participate was implied when
participants decided to engage in the research and complete
the agent evaluation. Convenience sampling was employed,
with subjects selected due to their convenient accessibility,
and proximity to the author. A representative sample (n=12)
of users completed the agent evaluation. Results of the agent
evaluation are presented in Section V-C.
B. Use-Case Development
To demonstrate the capabilities of the conversational agent,
five use cases were identified, mapped to the custom intents,
and used to test the functionality of the conversational agent.
Use-Case One: In this scenario, a user is not aware of
any threats or unusual activity within the network, and would
simply like to request a summary of all activity taking place
today. The user invokes the Alexa Skill using the specified
invocation name (Threat Detector), and then proceeds to
request a summary of activity. If the input is matched by
the speech recognition engine to one of the specified custom
intents and utterances (described in Section IV-B), a query is
triggered, and a response returned. Below is the conversation
as a result of the user query:
User: “Alexa open Threat Detector”
Alexa: “Hi, welcome to Threat Detector, how can I
help ?”
User: “show me a summary of today’s activity”
Alexa: “Sure, Today there has been 100.0 percent
normal activity and 0.0 percent unusual activity. Is
there anything else I can help you with ?”
Use-Case Two: In the second scenario, a user suspects a
threat or unusual activity has occurred within the network.
They invoked the intent associated with the first scenario
and have been told there has been no unusual activity today.
The user proceeds to query the database for unusual activity
on a different date (perhaps yesterday). Again, if the input
is matched by the speech recognition engine, to one of the
specified custom intents and utterances, a query is triggered,
and a response returned. Below is the conversation as a result
of the user query:
User: “show me a summary of activity for twenty
january two thousand nineteen”
Alexa: “No problem, On 2019-01-20 there was
94.74 percent normal activity and 5.26 percent un-
usual activity. Are there any other activities you
would like to know about ?”
Use-Case Three: In the third scenario, a user suspects a
threat or unusual activity has occurred within the network, on
a specified date. They suspect a specific device may be causing
the problem, so proceed to query the database for unusual
activity on a specified date, by the given source device. Again,
if the input is matched by the speech recognition engine, to
one of the specified custom intents and utterances, a query is
triggered, and a response returned. Below is the conversation
as a result of the user query:
User: “show me a summary of activity by one nine
two dot one six eight dot two five two dot forty on
twenty january two thousand nineteen”
Alexa: “Of course, Summary for 2019-01-20 For de-
vice 192.168.252.40 there was 94.74 percent normal
activity and 5.26 percent unusual activity. How can
I be of further assistance ?”
Use-Case Four: In the fourth scenario, a user suspects a
threat or unusual activity has occurred within the network, on
a specified date. They are unsure which device has caused the
problem, so proceed to query the database for the first unusual
activity on the specified date. The intention is to identify which
specific device may be causing the problem. Again, if the input
is matched by the speech recognition engine, to one of the
specified custom intents and utterances, a query is triggered,
and a response returned. Below is the conversation as a result
of the user query:
User: “show me details of first unusual activity on
twenty january two thousand nineteen”
Alexa: “My pleasure, First unusual activity on 2019-
01-20 For which, I.D is 410 Date Time is 20/01/2019
19:01 Source Device is 192.168.252.40 Destination
Device is 118.56.238.213 Data Type is TCP Activity
type is unusual. Is there anything else I can help you
with ?”
Use-Case Five: In the fifth scenario, a user suspects a threat
or unusual activity has occurred within the network, on a
specified date. They have invoked other intents to query the
database, and now suspect they know when a threat or unusual
activity took place. They now query the database to get full
details of the activity ID of when the unusual activity occurred.
Again, if the input is matched by the speech recognition
engine, to one of the specified custom intents and utterances,
a query is triggered, and a response returned. Below is the
conversation as a result of the user query:
User: “show me details for activity id three hundred
sixty six”
Alexa: “I.D is 366 Date Time for that is 18/01/2019
19:01 Source Device is 192.168.252.21 Destination
Device is 192.168.252.60 Data Type is TCP Activity
type is normal. What else would you like to know?”
C. Agent Evaluation
To evaluate our conversational agent, each participant was
asked to complete a pre-test survey and indicate their level of
agreement with five statements, using a Likert-type scale from
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
s1: I am confident I can tell if my home network is
functioning normally.
s2: I am confident I can tell if an IoT device on my
network has been compromised.
s3: I am confident I can tell if an attack has taken
place on my home network.
s4: I am confident I can tell which IoT devices are
using my home network.
s5: I am confident I can tell if an IoT device is
functioning normally.
Subsequently, participants were asked to use the conversa-
tional agent for the five use-cases presented in Section V-B
and record their answers to the queries. Finally, with the
new tool available to them, participants completed a post-
test survey of the same five statements, and variance in
their attitudes was recorded (see Table I). Since we were
comparing related groups, where participants completed the
same survey pre and post test, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
were used for comparisons. Statements (s1-s3) demonstrated
a statistically significant median increase in agreement level,
between pre and post test surveys. Statements (s4-s5) did
not demonstrate any variance. Pre-test mode values for state-
ments (s1-s2) demonstrated participants disagreed with the
statements, suggesting participants were not initially confident
they could tell if their network was functioning correctly or
if a device had been compromised. The Post-test median
increase would suggest the use of the conversational agent
had improved situational awareness in these areas. To a lesser
extent this was also true for statement (s3). Statements (s4-s5)
did not show any median increase, however the Pre-test mode
values for these statements suggested the participants were
already confident they knew which IoT devices were using
the network, and functioning correctly.
D. Suggested Improvements
On conclusion of the post-test survey, participants were
asked for suggestions of possible improvements to the conver-
sational agent. For brevity, these are summarised as follows:
1) normal network functionality: The ability to get a simple
status of the network and if any unusual activity has
occured.
2) compromised device: The ability to see which devices
have been active on the network on a given date, and
their total activity.
3) prescence of an attack: The ability to see the total
activity for a device, and combined total for the network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents the implementation of a novel conver-
sational agent for detecting anomalous traffic in consumer IoT
networks. In Section I, we presented the problem of detecting
threats within consumer IoT networks. We demonstrated that
without any clear signs of infection, it was very difficult for
consumers to know when their devices are part of a botnet,
performing large scale DDoS attacks. Results in Section V,
clearly demonstrate that the presented agent could make a
positive contribution towards improving situational awareness
of threats in IoT networks. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to use a conversational agent to perform aural
analysis in this domain. Despite this, limitations were identi-
fied in the study. Push notifications could further improve SA,
however are not currently permitted by AWS. In the future,
we plan to increase the functionality of the agent to include
the suggested improvements highlighted by participants. In
addition, we intend to investigate the suggestion in [20], and
evaluate a multimodal approach to threat detection.
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